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Projecting Wor(l)ds: The Descriptive
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Jagna Oltarzewska
1 The play on word and world in my title makes no great claim to originality, it simply
underscores a tension inherent in literary description, one noted, mostly with unease, by
generations  of  writers  and  critics:  its  referential  anchoring,  on  the  one  hand,  its
tendency, on the other, to float free of the world by foregrounding and revelling in its
own linguistic substance. Alexandre Gefen sums up this paradox elegantly:
À bien y regarder, la description constitue […] à la fois l’irruption « naturelle » du
réel dans le texte, mais aussi le moment où le texte s’affiche dans sa matérialité (la
prégnance du lexique par rapport aux actions, des noms par rapport aux verbes),
son artificialité (les jeux de symétrie et de construction dont procède la mise en
espace du réel), et donc dans sa « littérarité » (moment de stase du texte littéraire,
la  description  est  souvent  poétique  dans  un  récit).  D’où  ce  paradoxe  que  le
descriptif […] pousse la représentation, au risque de l’intrigue, vers le miroir aux
alouettes de l’exhaustivité et la dangereuse passion des détails.1
2 In modernist (and postmodernist) modes of writing, the descriptive both sharpens and
enjoys this founding ambivalence, complicating the relationship between signifier and
referent in a process of self-conscious play that has been qualified as “narcissistic”,2 a
term  suggesting  increased  self-awareness  bordering  uneasily  on  self-obsession.
Contemporary novelistic practice unsettles the boundaries between projected, textualised
worlds  and  what  Thomas  Pavel  calls  “the  really  real  world”3 and  yet  the  idea  of
“projecting/ed worlds” is strongly identified with a current of literary criticism which
considers these same boundaries as a theoretical given — and here I allude to Possible
Worlds Theory, as elaborated in the 80s and 90s in the work of Thomas Pavel and Marie-
Laure Ryan in the States, Brian McHale and Ruth Ronen of the Tel-Aviv School. For all the
sensitivity they show to the many ways in which the fiction/reality divide is interrogated
in contemporary writing, these critics maintain an allegiance to the ontological priority
of  the  afore-mentioned  “really  real  world”,  a  stance  they  share  with  classical
narratologists  for  whom the  relationship  of  fiction  to  reality  is  essentially  mimetic.
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Although I borrow their ruling metaphor, my title is not intended as an expression of
solidarity  with  such  theories,  nor  would  I  want  it  to  imply  that  the  writers  under
consideration  conceive  of  their  activity,  descriptive  or  otherwise,  as  serving
straightforwardly mimetic ends. On the contrary, the relationship of word to world is to
be imagined here as one of equality without privilege; the descriptive as deployed in the
texts under scrutiny does not set out primarily to imitate, reflect or otherwise transcode
a preexisting empirical  “reality”  nor  does  it  play  the  subservient  role  prescribed by
generations of critics (including Genette, who distils a long history of opprobrium when
he styles  it  as  the handmaid of  narration,  “a slave […]  always necessary,  but  always
submissive, never emancipated”4). The turn to description as analysed in the passages
that follow will be seen to have a very different reach and agenda: it brings the reader up
against the aporetic limits of a rhetoric rich in detail yet failing, conspicuously, as a site of
knowledge;  far  from  functioning  as  an  “operator  of  readability”5 it  scrambles
information, dislodging the various narrative instances from their accustomed positions
of agency or reception;  it  amounts,  in short,  to a close,  inventive questioning of  the
exorbitant powers of representation associated with the descriptive utterance, especially
in its high realist mode.
3 Before turning my attention to specific uses of the descriptive in contemporary writing, I
feel it necessary to contextualize this notion in an attempt to gain firmer purchase on my
object of study. As Philippe Hamon has noted in his pioneering essay,6 the descriptive
tends  to  be  defined  negatively,  by  opposition  to  terms  such  as  theoretical,  analytical,
interpretative, couplings which are clearly not to its advantage. The one exception might
be the linguist’s distinction between prescriptive and descriptive approaches: here it is the
latter that are positively inflected, suggesting an empiricism of method that allows rules
and patterns to emerge directly from the mutable body of linguistic utterance rather than
imposing them by external  fiat.  The descriptive in this  sense is  likely to appeal in a
theoretical climate which favours immanence over transcendence and regards all master-
signifiers as suspiciously complicit with the Grand Narratives of yesteryear. Yet even here
the descriptive does not get an altogether easy ride. In 1974, Juliet Mitchell, a prominent
British feminist, undertook to defend Freud against the reductive critique of an angry
second wave who dismissed psychoanalysis as “the culture-bound product of a small-
minded ‘Victorian’ patriarch confronted by incredible numbers of sex-starved, hysterical
women”.7 Mitchell’s defence turned precisely on the prescriptive/descriptive distinction:
she argued that Freud was describing the internalisation of existing power structures and
their unconscious representation, not aiming to enshrine the patriarchal system through
a totalising, prescriptive account of mental functioning and gender acquisition. Despite the
brilliance with which her thesis is developed it does of course beg the question of the
“ideological innocence”8 of Freud’s descriptive position as he puzzled over the ills of the
sex-starved, hysterical female hordes of fin-de-siècle Vienna. Feminists have legitimately
questioned Freud’s  failure to advocate social  and political  change,  given the scale  of
damage he witnessed and recorded in clinical practice. In the field of the human sciences,
descriptive methodologies are notoriously liable to charges of political naïveté or worse,
tacit support of institutionalised oppression. This leads us to the familiar question of
whether powerful descriptive systems such as Freud’s are not always complicit with (or
even shored up by) forms of extreme conservatism, masquerading as a bracketing of the
political in the broader interests of science.
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4 There is a recent article that gravitates around related questions in the field of literary
studies — it is entitled “Whatever happened to descriptive poetics?”9 and its author is
Brian McHale. McHale describes (and laments) the demise of what he calls “theories of
the middle-range”, sacrificed, he claims, at the altar of “high” theory which intends, no
less,  to supplant interpretation in its  “voracious” and “imperialistic” bids to exhaust
textual  meaning (the imagery is  McHale’s  but his  position is  not an unfamiliar one).
Theories of the middle-range would include a descriptive poetics, which “aspires to give
exhaustive accounts of objects of various kinds” among them “the practices of a ‘school’
or ‘tradition’ of writing […] or specific literary techniques, devices, topoï, repertoires etc”
10. As a semiotics-based account of the descriptive, Philippe Hamon’s book provides an
excellent example of middle-range theory. And I think McHale is right to conclude that
the middle-range is under threat, not because of “high” theory’s rampant megalomania,
but  more  simply  because  of  a  recent  dialectical  shift  in  the  critical  paradigm.  If
descriptive approaches modelled on structural linguistics held sway from the mid 60s
into the late 70s, the decades that followed saw the rise (in the Anglo-American academy)
of issue-based, politicized approaches focusing on the problematics of race, class, gender
and  body,  nation  and  diaspora  —  these  unsettle  the  universalizing  claims  and
methodological assumptions of a formalist descriptive project such as narratology, which
suddenly finds itself  on the defensive.  Building on the work of  J.L.  Austin,  Grice and
Searle, pragmatic theories of literature and reading centre attention on the negotiations
and cognitive adjustments  occurring in the space between text,  reader,  and context,
implicitly questioning the “scientific” posture of narratology with regard to its object.
Furthermore,  a  battery  of  psychoanalytic  and  philosophical  concepts attaining
prominence over the past thirty years or so has created a climate of thought that either
marginalizes  the  descriptive  or  more  seriously  eats  away  at  the  foundations  that
guarantee it uncomplicated powers of representation.
5 It is this conceptual climate I turn to next, as one hostile element in a broad picture from
which the descriptive/description finds itself increasingly erased or excluded, and this is
where my attempt at contextualization must end. But before proceeding further, it may
be useful to distinguish three uses of the term “descriptive”, which have so far tended to
criss-cross or merge:
1. The metalinguistic sense, as in the expression “a descriptive poetics”.
2. The denotative sense: the designation of an object of study, as in the title of Philippe
Hamon’s book, where the “descriptif” in question is the rhetorical figure set up as the
dominant of the 19th century realist text. In Hamon’s terminology, le descriptif subsumes
both description as  a narrative moment and the global  impulse or  orientation — “le
mouvement fondamental” — of the “readerly” text.11 With the -if suffix we accede to a
higher level of abstraction, which translates an effort on Hamon’s part to rethink an
ancient and coarse dichotomy that has long dogged the analyst: description as static (the
descriptive pause) / narration as dynamic (the forward-moving, teleologically-impelled
plot). To resume: so far we have seen the term descriptive used in a metalinguistic and a
“straight” sense. An anxiety immediately arises: if Hamon’s is a descriptive poetics — a
description of the descriptive? — the barrier between critical metalanguage and object
begins to look alarmingly fragile and we face the possibility — a semiotician’s nightmare
— that there might indeed, as Lacan suggests, be no metalanguage. Such knowledge as we
gain of the descriptive appears to rely for its expression on the rhetorical figure set up as
the object of enquiry, a predicament that neatly sums up a major paradox of cognition.
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This chiastic intertwining of critical discourse and object may have something to do with
the slipperiness,  elusiveness and internal  contradictions of  description as noted by a
number of critics.12
3. Finally, we turn to a sense of the descriptive as narrative mode or figure in widespread
use, surviving theory wars and shifts in the episteme, though perhaps serving purposes
and generating effects rather different to those ascribed to Hamon’s descriptif and which
remain to be analysed.
6 Now, if purely descriptive approaches to the text are merely less fashionable today than
they were some thirty years ago, there is reason to fear that the descriptive as an object of
study — the figure or dominant explored by Hamon — may actually be in crisis. This is
because, as currently defined, it cannot be accommodated by an aesthetic which it seeks
to distance itself  from the logic of  mimesis  and its  metaphysical  underpinnings.  The
attack on mimesis is of course nothing new and the work of Lyotard, Derrida and Deleuze
is  frequently  read  as  a  radical  working  through  of  the  Modernist  critique  of
representation. But if, as Hamon suggests “the descriptive enjoys privileged links with the
global aesthetic of Mimesis, especially as it attained dominance in the Western world
from the Renaissance onwards”,13 then this same descriptive is surely fated to remain in
sufferance as non-mimetic or anti-mimetic concepts increasingly take hold of the critical
imagination: the simulacrum, as theorised by Deleuze and Baudrillard, and its literary
avatar,  the fraudulent narrator whose descriptions no longer offer what Hamon calls
“semantic gain”, “enhanced readability”, “additional information”,14 but point instead to
permanent  semantic  deficit  and  a  knowledge  in  infinite  regress;  the  event  in  its
singularity,  a  lightning bolt  or  “caesura in space-time”15 that  defies  and disables  the
descriptive impulse (Lyotard, Badiou); the sublime, as it emerges from Lyotard’s reading
of Edmund Burke and Kant. Lyotard locates the sublime both in the ekstatic instant, the
“now” or unrepeatable occurrence that is the work of art, and in the unpresentable fact
of its occurrence to which the work must stand witness16. If the descriptive act requires
temporal extension, however minimal, and the presentability, or more traditionally, re-
presentability of its objects, then Lyotard’s sublime denies it both. Derrida and Vattimo
elaborate a post-Heideggerian concept of the art work as “inauguration” or disclosure of
a world whose referential and imitative ties with “the really real world” are irreversibly
sundered.17
7 The  mimetic  relationship  of  work  to  world  which  favoured  the  rise  of  Hamon’s
descriptive and ratified its position as textual dominant has been succeeded (though as
we shall see not superseded) by a powerful conception of art as world unto itself, not a
reflection,  translation,  abstraction but  a  material  addition,  existing  side-by-side  with
reality as its enigmatic other, much as the unconscious is the other of conscious life. And
this analogy reminds us that there is  a psychoanalytical  contribution to the ongoing
critique of “the mimetic fix”:18 Lacan’s concept of the Real, now enjoying unprecedented
popularity in film theory and art criticism in the anglophone world, largely thanks to the
single-handed efforts of its champion Slavoj Zizek. The Real, it will be remembered, is
that order of experience that resists the sign, and resists it absolutely; it is at once the
brute stuff of life and the “black remnant” of symbolisation that arrests the descriptive
gesture in mid-flight.
8 In  contemporary  theoretical  debate  the  descriptive  does  then  appear  to  have  been
sidelined or crowded out, both as a methodology of the middle range and as an object of
study in its own right. The history of Hamon’s book is instructive: re-issued in 1993 (the
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fourth printing) with no changes to the original text (published in 1981), except for a few
footnotes, clarifications, and an updated bibliography. This sends an ambivalent signal:
was  Hamon’s  opening  statement  so  exhaustive  that  it  rendered  further  comment
spurious? Has this study of the descriptive simply not provoked the uptake that might
have re-energized the topic and taken it in new directions? And if so, why? We need only
glance at contemporary critical writing to note that the descriptive as rhetorical figure,
category,  system  (Hamon’s  terms)  is  massively  overshadowed  by  tropes such  as
metalepsis, allegory, metaphor.
9 Whatever the reasons for this eclipse of the descriptive, we would do well to remember
that theoretical debate is only a tiny part of the bigger picture, though academics are
notoriously apt to confuse this part with the whole. Turning, then to the third and final
sense of “descriptive” listed above: mimesis is in fact alive and well, and rumours of its
imminent  demise,  as  Andrew  Gibson  reminds  us,  have  been  greatly  exaggerated:
“Representation, mimesis, the lisible are not simply to be overcome. Rather, they have
now been reworked, as Vattimo would have it, again, in weakened form.”19 A huge body of
literature cutting across the serious/popular divide testifies to the resilience of realist
modes of writing, where description’s referential drive and efficacy seem unimpaired. In
this connection, Fredric Jameson has spoken of the postmodern fascination with what he
calls  “schlock  and  kitsch”20,  a  category  that  includes  the  billion-dollar  industry  of
paraliterature  (celebrity  bios,  crime  novels,  thrillers,  etc.)  whose  attachment  to  the
mimetic mode is steadfast and uninhibited. If anything, a casual glance at the ambient
culture  uncovers  a  paroxystic  abundance  of  description  aided  and  abetted  by  the
explosion of information technology and telecommunications. Disdained by theory, the
descriptive continues to flourish unabated in current cultural practice.
10 I turn now to individual examples of literary description in contemporary writing and
would like, here, to comment on my choice of texts. If we accept the hypothesis that it is
in realist or neo-realist modes that the descriptive is most strongly in evidence, then one
option  is  to  analyse  its  function  in  texts  that  openly  derive  from  or  exploit  the
conventions of realism. There is one prominent novelistic genre that could arguably be
identified as a natural successor of realism: it has a vested interest in conveying reality
effects and possesses unusual gravity of tone and intent (Philippe Hamon reminds us that
“realist  discourse presents itself  as  essentially serious”21 — it  is  that  of  testimony or
testimonial fiction, which sets itself the impossible task of commemorating a past known
to be irretrievable.  Toni  Morrison’s  Beloved (1987)  and Margaret  Atwood’s  Alias  Grace
(1996) are testimonial narratives dealing with past realities that have been described, or
written out of the official historical archive and consequently, to use Morrison’s verb,
“disremembered”. The ambition of such texts is not to restore truth or supply knowledge
of such realities but precisely to bear witness to that which has always already been
forgotten, repressed or concealed: the truth about Grace Marks in Atwood’s novel, the
truth about Margaret Garner (the historical inspiration for Morrison’s Sethe), a woman
who murders her child rather than have her experience slavery; the loss of “Sixty Million
and more” thought to have perished as a consequence of slavery and to whose memory
Morrison’s novel is dedicated.
11 In Alias Grace, as in the 19th century realist novel, description has pride of place: critics
have noted Atwood’s commitment to detail, her painstaking efforts to reconstruct 19th 
century  Toronto,  its  streets,  interiors,  smells,  climate,  the  external  trappings  of  its
inhabitants.  Such detail  masks  and compensates  for  missing knowledge,  but  its  very
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proliferation underscores the epistemological fault-line at the heart of the novel: who
was Grace? Did she murder her employers? Why? Atwood’s is a fictionalized account of a
notorious  19th century  figure,  Grace  Marks.  Together  with  her  fellow-servant,  James
McDermott, Grace was charged with the double murder of her employer Thomas Kinnear
and his housekeeper Nancy Montgomery. McDermott was sent to the gallows but Grace’s
sentence was commuted to life and she divided it between a Penitentiary in Kingston,
Ontario, and a lunatic asylum. Records suggest she may occasionally have worked for
spells at the Prison Governor’s on day-release. She obtained a pardon in 1872 and went to
a so-called “home provided” in New York State.
12 Confronted  with  the  task  of  fictionalizing  the  irretrievable  (Grace’s  psychology  and
motivation,  forever  foreclosed  from knowledge),  Atwood  chooses  to  project  a  world
which convinces in its outward aspect but foils the reader’s narrative desire at every turn,
resolving into a lush but impenetrable verbal décor.  In the novel’s climactic scene —
Grace is hypnotised before a public agog for the final revelation (a typically tongue-in-
cheek mise en abyme of readerly curiosity) — attention is once again deflected from the
fictional  world and its  consistency onto the spoken word,  invested,  here,  with equal
weight and moment; because the truth is held to ransom, or, to put it less dramatically,
held in abeyance by the undecidable nature of Grace’s speech act — we cannot know, in
this scene, whether she is performing madness or genuinely possessed by her dead friend
Mary Whitney. In Alias Grace, the descriptive both overdetermines and underdetermines
attempts at interpretation, carrying a surfeit of factual information while withholding
the one item of knowledge that might assuage and gratify: a plausible account of what
happened on the 23 July 1843.
13 Philippe Hamon has identified description as a textual repository of “knowledge” and
“competence”,22 an insight the literary text has been quick to integrate and exploit. But
description is not simply a figure, it also possesses a syntax, and that syntax is one of
assertion. As Barbara Johnson has pointed out, a declarative syntax generates its own
referential effects, and these are effects of knowledge.23 So description, “un faire-savoir
appuyé sur un savoir-faire”24) as Hamon neatly puts it, benefits from a syntactic form that
increases its force as utterance of knowledge. By quoting descriptions of Grace Marks’
physiognomy  and  behaviour  which  were,  for  a  long  time,  considered  authoritative,
Atwood provides an implicit metatextual commentary which could be summarized thus:
when  made  available  to  a  wide  reading  public,  eye-witness  descriptions  are  briskly
naturalised into knowledge and truth. Susanna Moodie — the describer in question — was
a contemporary of Grace’s, a Canadian immigrant writer who chronicled her experiences
in journals familiar to the anglophone Canadian. She visited Grace in the Penitentiary and
recounted what she saw there in Life  in  the  Clearings (1853),  extracts from which are
positioned as epigraphs to chapters of Atwood’s novel. I quote one glorious instance of
verbal portraiture here in full:
She  is  a  middle-sized  woman,  with  a  slight,  graceful  figure.  There  is  an  air  of
hopeless  melancholy  in  her  face  which  is  very  painful  to  contemplate.  Her
complexion is fair and must,  before the touch of hopeless sorrow paled it,  have
been very brilliant. Her eyes are a bright blue, her hair auburn, and her face would
be rather handsome were it not for the long curved chin which gives, as it always
does to most persons who have this facial defect, a cunning, cruel expression.
Grace Marks glances at  you with a sidelong,  stealthy look;  her eye never meets
yours, and after a furtive regard, it invariably bends its gaze upon the ground. She
looks like a person rather above her humble station…25
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14 This collection of Victorian clichés mobilises all the resources of what Barthes called the
“cultural code” in the service of credible, definitive portraiture, mingling an exacerbated
pathos with clear attribution of guilt. Here is a writing bent on effacing the signs of its
production in order to guarantee maximum readability and impact — straightforward
syntax, conventional semantic coupling (hopeless melancholy, hopeless sorrow, bright blue,
cunning  and  cruel,  sidelong  and  stealthy), mobilisation  of  the  reader’s  “encyclopaedic”
knowledge (long curved chins mean witches, facial defects for Moodie’s contemporaries
denote inner vices, shifty eyes are proof of guilt, etc.). In her juxtaposition of extracts
from  various  published  sources,  Atwood  assembles  and  quotes  rival  fragments  of
knowledge whose confident rhetoric is undercut by the main narrative, organized as it is
around a  mystery — Grace’s  amnesia  and her  dream,  the only vestige of  the events
occurring on July 23 1843. This erasure at the heart of the story is the textual inscription
of an abiding and irreversible ignorance: in Atwood’s words, the “true character of the
historical  Grace Marks remains  an enigma”.26 This  enigma underscores  the vanity of
received  knowledge  (vanity  in  the  twofold  sense  of  self-importance  and  vacuity),  a
knowledge revealed, by means of citation, as a binding of rhetoric (description), cultural
cliché (readability) and syntax (assertion), ratified by the printing-press; but the erasure
also suggests that the servant’s world is wholly annexed and subsumed by the word of the
Other; her script is confiscated, she is described and cannot speak for herself as there is
no longer a self to speak of, as suggested here:
Murderess [Grace reflects] is a strong word to have attached to you. It has a smell to
it, that word — musky and oppressive, like dead flowers in a vase. Sometimes at
night I whisper it to myself: Murderess, Murderess. It rustles, like a taffeta skirt across
the floor.
Murderer is merely brutal. It’s like a hammer, or a lump of metal. I would rather be a
murderess than a murderer, if those are the only choices.
15 The fading of the self as consequence of a radical dispossession, the loss of sanity and
ebbing of life-force following a confiscation of experience which is first and foremost a
confiscation  of  language,  its  instrumentality,  its  performative  reach;  with  these
deleterious effects of silencing in mind, I turn now to Morrison’s Beloved. One of Beloved’s
more positive functions in the narrative which bears her name is to unleash language,
prompting Sethe, Denver and Paul D to reclaim a lost power of self-description. That
slaves  are  denied  this  among  other  freedoms  is  dramatized  by  Morrison  through  a
narrative technique in which the descriptive plays a vital  role.  It  is  no accident that
Morrison chooses to report — describe — the crucial episode of child-killing in Beloved
from the standpoint  of  the four horsemen — “schoolteacher,  one nephew,  one slave
catcher  and  a  sheriff27 who  come  to  reclaim  Sethe  and  her  children  into  slavery.
Focalisation (it  is  the  men who see  and tell)  and narrative  order  (theirs  is  the  first
detailed account the reader gets) allow Morrison to make a strong point: Sethe’s story is
not in her hands, it has ”always already" been expropriated by her owners, and it is their
reading of that story that will decide her immediate fate:
Inside, two boys bled in the sawdust and dirt at the feet of a nigger woman holding
a blood-soaked child to her chest with one hand and an infant by the heels in the
other. She did not look at them; she simply swung the baby toward the wall planks,
missed and tried to connect a second time, when out of nowhere — in the ticking
time the men spent staring at what there was to stare at — the old nigger boy, still
mewing, ran through the door behind them and snatched the baby from the arch of
its mother’s swing.
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Right off it was clear, to schoolteacher especially, that there was nothing there to
claim.28
16 The deliberate stylistic flattening translates an absence or withdrawal of affect, apparent
only in the dismissive “nigger” which betrays the slant of what might otherwise pass for a
neutral  account.  The  bare,  descriptive  style  conveys  the  impression  that  facts  are
speaking for themselves, directly and unambiguously: “Right off it was clear…” Here, the
gap between description and comprehension is effectively sealed: to see is to understand,
and that understanding is of the instant. The men stare “at what there was to stare at”,
not because it challenges their frame of reference, but because they are momentarily
hypnotised  by  violence  as  spectacle  and  require  “ticking  time”  only  to  process  its
consequences for them — Sethe driven mad, her children dead or dying, no immediate or
future prospect of gain for the masters of Sweet Home.
17 The passages cited above dramatize, in one way or another, the relation of description to
knowledge, since I wish to suggest that much contemporary writing — and in particular
the genre of testimonial fiction — plays with the conventional effects of the descriptive,
whether  by  insisting on description’s  shortcomings  with regard to  a  past  posited as
irretrievable,  by  exposing  the  “situatedness”  of  the  describer,  or  by  laying  bare  the
fabricated nature of a received wisdom congealed into common knowledge. To complete
the picture, it would have been interesting to explore the modalities or strategies of the
descriptive in its (always failed) attempt to grapple with or capture the reality posited by
the  genre:  that  reality  which  is  elided  through  trauma,  forgetfulness,  amnesia,
disremembering, appearing only as a confused and reiterated dream-time, requiring an
endless redescription which announces its spectral, unassuageable, vindictive return.
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